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Just War Reasoning in an Age of Risk 
Esther D. Reed 
Abstract 
The classic, theological tradition of just war reasoning (JWT) is not exhausted 
but needed more-than-ever in the shadow of global risks, when facing 
‘hybrid’ war, and when the difference between war and peace is said to be 
blurring. The tradition does not speak with one voice but debate within the 
tradition about the (un)acceptability of military action under conditions of 
uncertainty sheds light, in at least three ways, on ways of approaching the 
range of unorthodox tactics threated in conflict today: 
1. How to be fearful. Fear and anxiety in an age of risk are potential 
threats to reason. The JWT has resources with which to consider ‘how 
to fear’ wisely. 
2. How to grapple with issues of classification, including what 
constitutes an attack equivalent to an ‘armed attack’ under UN Charter 
Art 51. When, for instance, are cyber attacks are better dealt with 
under civilian, international commercial law, and when the laws of 
war?  
3. How to approach new challenges in a principled manner.  Are 
different principles or criteria are needed to govern action (e.g., the 
criterion of intensity) or do immediacy and necessity remain the most 
critically important principles in our moral arsenal? 
The Concept of Risk Today 
Since Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky worked on risk, culture and perceptions of 
uncertainty in the 1980s, a central assumption in sociology and political theory has been that 
risk is a social construction in particular historical and cultural contexts.1 We are interested in 
this essay in how risk management and the securitization mindset are affecting attitudes to 
armed conflict and its regulation by international law, and consider cyber attacks as a mode of 
securitization that is becoming militarized. (Related questions about whether violence is 
becoming therapeutically calming to the social psyche, and whether there is evidence of 
politicians invoking risk rhetorically for questionable advantage, are relevant but outside our 
immediate scope.) The claim is that the classic, theological tradition of just war reasoning 
(JWT) is not exhausted but needed more-than-ever in the shadow of global risks, when facing 
‘hybrid’ war, and when the difference between war and peace is said to be blurring.  
Ulrich Beck brought the concepts of risk and risk research to prominence in sociology and 
social theory over the past few decades, and is widely recognised has having expressed 
concerns about the consequences of modernity, fears about risk and security as a result of 
                                                
1 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. Risk and Culture: An essay on the selection of technical and 
environmental dangers (University of California Press, 1982).  
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globalisation and its implications for the state and social organisation.2 I broadly suppose 
Beck’s idea of ‘the risk society’ as shorthand for his account of the transition from ‘modern’ 
industrial societies wherein, broadly speaking, risk was conceived as calculable to 
‘postmodern’ societies trust in the calculability of risk is waning, new paradigms of uncertainty 
become entrenched, and a sense of global risk opens up complex moral and political spaces of 
responsibility individuals must negotiate for themselves. Risk as we are experiencing it, for 
Beck, is a phenomenon of a godless world wherein anxiety is becoming the dominant cultural 
grammar, with risks experienced at the national level inseparable from risks at the global level 
that are variously economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological. 3  Of 
interest for our purposes is how risk management and the securitization mindset is affecting 
attitudes to armed conflict and its regulation by international law.  
The so-called ‘risk society’ thesis and accompanying risk assessments have found their 
way into international relations, military strategy documents and, indeed, the UK National 
Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) which is intended to guide the on-going Strategic Defence and 
Security Review in its delivery of national security, albeit with further reports, until 2015.4 The 
NSS sets out a ‘whole government’ approach to security, and headlines high priority risks: 
international terrorism, cyber attack, international military crises (including those prompted by 
nuclear weapons proliferation) and large-scale civil emergencies, major accidents or natural 
hazards. It is a relatively brief document but its significance, says Michael Clarke, Director, 
RUSI, is that it turns the traditional conception of security on its head. ‘What is to be defended, 
it says, is not so much the territory of Britain or even the organs of the British state, so much as 
the way of life of the people of Britain; their ability to go about their business here and in the 
rest of the world freely and with confidence’.5 It’s not really a strategy as such, says Clarke, in 
that it ‘does not make hard choices between real things — which is what strategists have to do’ 
but points to threats that should be taken seriously, and reminds is readers that the risk picture 
is likely to become increasingly diverse. ‘No single risk will dominate’ but the highest priority 
risks are those arising from international terrorism, cyber attack (including by other states, and 
                                                
2 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999). On this, see S.L. Darryl and D.S. Jarvis, ‘Risk, 
Globalisation and the State: A Critical Appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the World Risk Society Thesis’, 
Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 1, January, 2007, p.23. 
3 Beck, World Risk Society, p.333. 
4 UK National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-
strategy.pdf (accessed: 19 October, 2014). 
5 Preliminary RUSI Briefing: The National Security Strategy 2010, 18 Oct 2010. 
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4CBC6D8637AB7/#.VARL6EsWA8M (accessed: 19 
October, 2014). 
 
3/16 
 
 
by organised crime and terrorists), international military crises, large scale civil emergencies, 
and major accidents or natural hazards.6 
Christopher Coker has commented most directly on how national security strategies have 
moved in recent years from preoccupation with deterrence, defence and imminent dangers, to 
the language and practices of risk, awareness, pre-emption, precaution, surveillance, and 
vulnerability.7 His observations on the effects of anxiety before an unknown and uncertain 
future stand out. As governments lack confidence that we can manage risk and strategize 
insecurity, Coker underscores the role of anxiety as the dominant logic of the risk society. 
‘What is specific to many of our own anxieties’, he argues ‘is that they exist in the absence of 
any looming historical disaster’. 8  Donald Rumsfeld’s phrase ‘unknown unknowns’ is 
symptomatic of an important change rather than simply a tautological coinage and expresses 
high levels of anxiety in the face of uncertainty, unknown risks and the almost ungraspable 
complexity of the risks that we can begin to anticipate. Against this backdrop, Coker considers 
some of the consequences of the new logic of strategy and politics as formed by ‘the unknown, 
the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected’ and asks whether war and violence are becoming 
self-sustaining in the face of ‘unknown unknowns’. 9  Coker anticipates an increasing 
petrification of political processes and overly quick justification of violent responses to an 
increasingly wide range of risks: ‘We are now in the business of ‘managing insecurity’ or 
‘enabling greater or lesser stability’ or guaranteeing better ‘service provision’.10  
For present purposes, I adopt Coker’s broad sub-division of discourse about risk into:  
! risk as threat  
! risk as managing insecurity 
! risk as entailing the need to maintain ‘service provision’. 
Of interest is whether the JWT is capable of responding to this new context or is losing 
relevance to the most critical strategic choices in a context where ‘risk registers’ are now part 
of our NSS and as the language of risk assessment is commonplace in international relations. 
More specifically, we are interested in the characteristics of the anxiety that anticipates an 
unknown and uncertain future and whether the JWT’s precepts are losing direct relevance to 
                                                
6 NSS, 1.32. 
7 Christopher Coker, War in an Age of Risk (Polity Press, 2009). For an excellent review, see Claudia 
Aradau in Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 24.1 (Spring 2010). 
8 Coker, War in an Age of Risk, p.73. 
9 Coker, War in an Age of Risk, p. ix. 
10 Coker, War in an Age of Risk, p.17. Aradnau’s summary is useful: ‘While enmeshed in speculations 
about the future, the risk society appears to paradoxically lack a future that would radically change the 
status quo’. 
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the most critical strategic choices. ‘Its abstracted set of conventions’ says Paul Schulte, a 
former senior official in the UK Ministry of Defence and Department of International 
Development, no longer grips the increasingly convoluted landscapes of twenty-first-century 
conflict’ and have lost moral traction. Statesmen, philosophers, soldiers, and lawyers will have 
to work hard to rethink JWT’s intellectual purchase on events.11 
I have explicated elsewhere some of the reasons why the JWT criteria are said to be 
stretched to breaking point in other contexts.12 We are interested here in whether the narrowly 
judicial JWT misses the target, so to speak, with its criteria of ‘right authority’, ‘just cause’, 
‘rightful intention’, when the mindset at policy level is about identifying and minimizing risk, 
minimizing risk exposure, doing the cost / benefit analysis with respect to national interest, 
reassuring and training the public about security. Are the JWT and ‘risk society’ talking past 
one another? Or, as I suggest, does the JWT put urgently important questions to the ‘risk 
society’ about inter alia the ethical implications of placing risk at the centre of natural security 
policy, and how to theorise the relation between ‘just war’ and risk? 
Risk and the Just War Tradition 
Before proceeding to explicate why and how the JWT puts questions to the ‘risk society’, it is 
necessary to underline that just war reasoning is not all the same. Distinction may be drawn 
between the narrowly penal, judicial JWT (with theological roots in the writings inter alia of 
Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Isidore of Seville, the canon lawyers of the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries and the Salamancan school of moral theology) and what Richard Tuck 
dubs the modern humanist tradition (Gentili, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf through to Walzer 
and Rawls).13 At the heart of differences between the narrow, theological tradition and the 
looser secularist, humanist tradition is the progressive reduction of natural law reasoning to a 
narrow set of rights and the single, normative principle of national self-defence. We are 
interested predominantly in the resources of the classic theological, narrowly judicial JWT 
with a view to arguing that its resources shed light on ways of approaching the range of 
unorthodox tactics threated in conflict today: 
1. How to be fearful when, in an age of risk, fear and anxiety are potential threats to 
reason. The claim is that the JWT has resources with which to consider ‘how to fear’ 
wisely. 
                                                
11 Paul Schulte, ‘Morality and War’ in Oxford Handbook of War (OUP, 2012), p.113. 
12 Esther D. Reed, Theology for International Law (T and T Clark, 2013), ch. 5.  
13 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant 
(OUP, 2001). 
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2. How to grapple with issues of classification, including what constitutes an attack 
equivalent to an armed attack under UN Charter Art 51. When, for instance, are cyber 
attacks better dealt with under civilian, international commercial law, and when the 
laws of war?  
3. How to approach new challenges of the ‘risk society’ in a principled manner. Are 
different principles or criteria are needed to govern action (e.g., the criterion of 
intensity) or do immediacy and necessity remain the most critically important 
principles in our moral arsenal?  
Even within the JWT we find differing emphases regarding attitudes to self-defence in the face 
of threat. Any suggestion, however, that the JWT and ‘risk society’ must talk past one another 
because the former is backward looking to wrongs committed and the latter forward looking to 
threats ahead is overly simplistic. The JWT has looked, and can look, in both directions. More 
specifically:  
1. the JWT warns that excessive fear undermines prospects for peace. Fear is both 
common to human experience (a universal) and culturally constructed. There is need 
for the disciplining and instruction of fear even in the most precarious situations of 
risk; 
2. the JWT resists premature militarization of a problem that might be dealt with by other 
means. Issues of classification are set to become both pressing and contentious as 
lawyers, theorists and politicians debate what kind of attack in a cyber age is 
equivalent to an armed attack under UN Charter Art 2(4) and 51. ‘What is war’? has 
been a significant question since September 2001. Of interest is how JWT grappling 
with questions of continuity and discontinuity between ordinary and extraordinary 
means (policing and judicial means in relation to various kinds of injustice) help us 
face questions about when, for instance, cyber attacks are better dealt with under 
civilian, international commercial law, and when international humanitarian law (IHL) 
or the laws of war. I appeal to two core convictions in Grotius’s writings:  
! ‘For where the power of law ceases, there war begins’.14 
! ‘Now there are methods in law to prevent intended injuries, as well as actions 
for those actually committed’.15 
                                                
14 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (LWP), transl. A.C. Campbell (Batoche Books, 2001), 
Bk II, ch. 1, sec. II, p.61.  
15 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. II, p.61.  
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There are obligations upon governments to develop strong international legal 
frameworks to ensure that war does not begin early for want of judicial mean and 
‘methods in law’ to prevent escalation in the use of armed force as a political option in 
the face of risk. While the option for war remains always on table, the classical 
theological  
3. the JWT will treat the new challenges of the ‘risk society’ in a principled manner. This 
is not as simple as merely asserting that the familiar principles of ‘right authority’, 
‘just cause’ and ‘rightful intention’ should be applied in all situations. It is possible 
that, in a cyber age, the criterion of intensity should be considered. The claim in what 
follows, however, is that immediacy and necessity remain the critically important 
principles in our moral arsenal.  
Risk and Fearing Well 
Present-day proponents of the JWT are invited to consider when excessive fear undermines 
prospects for peace, why the quest for peace and security for a given nation should not be 
separated from wider questions about international order, and what scope there might be for 
consideration of the virtues in relation to fearing wisely and well. The resources for doing this 
are not exclusively Christian. Ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy speaks widely and diversely 
to the qualities of right fear and when fear becomes a threat to reason and hinders other virtues. 
Schooled in these traditions, John Chrysostom teaches that fear has been implanted by God in 
the human soul so that danger may be avoided.16 Augustine taught that the important question 
is not whether one fears but what one fears.17 Aquinas wrote more fully about fear in relation 
to other passions and knew that there are times when aspects of the passions are uncontrollable 
because the bodily disposition is not subject to reason and its command. Being dependent on 
both the changing unpredictable external world and changes that happen in the body as a 
consequence of fear, like all the passions, has a rebellious side and can be insubordinate to the 
governance of reason. 
On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the 
command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive 
appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.18 
                                                
16 John Chrysostom, Homily 34 on the Gospel of St Matthew 10:23. From Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, First Series, Vol. 10. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 
1888.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/200134.htm.  
17 Augustine, The City of God, transl. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1978), Bk IX, Ch. 5, p. 
285. 
18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (ST) I-II, q. 17, a. 7. Translated by Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, 1920. Online Edition Copyright © 2008 by Kevin 
Knight.http://www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html 
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Citing Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas distinguishes between a properly ‘political’ and a 
‘despotic’ relationship between the body and reason.19 Reasons knows about the independence 
and potential uncontrollability of the passions and thus tries to influence and guide the passions 
so that they are in accordance with the reason’s commands. What matters is relation between 
reason ruler and the passions so that the latter participate in rationality and are subject to 
reason at least partially: 
The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive 
appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in 
respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man 
becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the 
command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, 
which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the 
command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has 
various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.20 
Hence the need for the instruction and disciplining of both individuals and communities with 
respect to the passions in conjunction with the virtues.  
Moral virtue in the JWT cannot be without the passions, including fear, but only with the 
passions under the governance of reason directed toward the common good of all. There is no 
true moral virtue without the passions (including fear) but the passions cannot be separated 
from questions about justice, societal order, common good, and such like.21 While there is 
nothing wrong with fear per se, not all fear is conducive to courage, rightful anger, peace and 
international order. At the least, the JWT invites consideration of when fear ceases to be 
virtuous, contributing to human excellence, and slips into vice.  
The Just War Tradition and Risk as Threat 
The JWT was familiar with questions about risk experienced as threat. Diverse voices in the 
tradition at least attempted to hold together questions of how to fear well in relation to 
questions about prevention (seeking ‘to counter an adversary who either is preparing to mount 
an attack at a still undetermined point in the future, or, still more remotely, has acquired a 
military capability which, if exercised, would have devastating consequences for the defender’) 
and defensive preemption (armed defense against an offensive that, by demonstrable signs, is 
imminent, while the former presupposes a longer time-frame), and to address these questions 
with the more familiar concerns about justice developed to deal with wrongs already 
                                                
19 Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 56, a. 4: 
20 Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 17, a. 7: 
21 Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 59, a. 5: ‘But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive 
appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot 
be without passions’. 
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committed.22 Whether injury may be resisted even before it has been inflicted was not 
expressly discussed within the Decretum. As Gregory M. Reichberg notes in his study of 
preventive war in classical just war theory, however, a commentator explicated Gratian’s 
observations by noting closeness to the Roman rules on self-defence and two key conditions: 
preemptive self-defence must be exercised in the heat of the moment; the defender should limit 
himself to using only so much force as was necessary to ward off the attack. The already 
familiar principles of immediacy and proportionality with seen to apply.23 
Raymond of Peñafort later distinguished the force used in countering an attack (repulsio 
iniurie), i.e., defense, from any resort to force that had revenge as its primary goal. Raymond 
recognised the problems associated with how to define immediacy and appealed to the further 
principle of necessity: ‘if there is no other way (si aliter non potest) to counter the threat of the 
ambusher.’24 Like his predecessors, Vitoria placed strict limitations on what might be done in 
the name of defense. A person or group acting in self-defence was not allowed to seek redress 
for past harms or to punish wrongdoers, both would have been counted as offensive war, but 
was allowed limited modes of anticipatory action. Vitoria gave further considered attention to 
the questions of ius ad bellum. In continuity with Aquinas and mainstream scholastic 
traditions, he maintained that only such wrongdoing as constituted the serious violation of a 
right, could justify the use of force against an enemy but in an on-going just war may destroy 
castles to prevent further offensive. Vitoria also allows considerable scope for the exercise of 
discretion by a prince: ‘in a just war one may do everything necessary for the defence of the 
public good.’25 Fear in the face of threat is assumed but the principles of immediacy, 
proportionality and necessity win the day.  
Early in what Tuck calls the modern humanist tradition, Gentili endorses preventive war 
and urges: ‘We ought not to wait for violence to be offered us, if it is safer to meet it 
halfway’.26 Gentili states boldly that his intent was to assert the justice of defending one’s 
commonwealth not only against ‘dangers that are already meditated and prepared’ but also and 
especially against ‘those which are not meditated, but are probable (verisimilia) and possible 
                                                
22 These definitions are given by Gregory M. Reichberg, ‘Preventive War in Classical Just War Theory’, 
Journal of the History of International Law 9 (2007) 5–34, at p. 6. 
23 Raymundus de Pennafort, Summa de poenitentia, et matrimonio, cum glossis Ioannis de Friburgo [= 
William of Rennes], part II, § 18, Rome, 1603. Cited in Reichberg, ‘Preventive War’, p.9. 
24 de Pennafort, Summa, ibid. 
25 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de iure belli; o, Paz dinámica, L. Pereña, V. Abril, C. Baciero, A. 
García, & F. Maseda, eds., Corpus Hispanorum de Pace VI (Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 1981). Translation: Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, Anthony 
Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 295–327, § 15. Cited in 
Reichberg, ‘Preventive War’, p.15. 
26 Alberico Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (Hanau: G. Antonius, 1612), I, XIV, pp. 96–107. Cited in 
Reichberg, ‘Preventive War’, p.15. 
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(possibilia)’. He accepts the use military action against likely attack though circumscribes this 
action by maintaining that such action must be applied with circumspection since it is not 
meant to cover just any situation in which a prince has grown in power against his peers. More 
than sheer power arrayed against a prince is needed to justify military action: some other 
reason must be added for justice’s sake. Under conditions of uncertainty, Gentili argues, it is 
justifiable to “make war through fear that we may ourselves be attacked. No one is more 
quickly laid low than one who has no fear, and a sense of security is the most common cause 
of disaster. ... We ought not to wait for violence to be offered us, if it is safer to meet it 
halfway. ... Therefore ... those who desire to live without danger ought to meet impending evils 
and anticipate them.”27 Gentili does not mean only that the harm is underway but that the 
opponent has the capacity to inflict harm: 
 A just cause for fear is demanded; suspicion is not enough. Now a just fear is 
defined as the fear of a greater evil, a fear which might properly be felt even by a 
man of great courage. Yet in the case of great empires I cannot readily accept that 
definition, which applies to private affairs. For if a private citizen commit some 
offence against a fellow citizen, reparation may be secured through the authority of 
a magistrate. But what a prince has done to a prince, no one will make good. 
But since there is more than one justifiable cause for fear, and no general rule can 
be laid down with regard to the matter, we will merely say this, which has always 
been a powerful argument and must be considered so today and hereafter: namely, 
that we should oppose powerful and ambitious chiefs. For they are content with no 
bounds, and end by attacking the fortunes of all.28 
In other words, Gentili addressed directly the question of a just cause for fear and was one of 
the first authors in the Christian West openly to endorse the idea of preventive war on the 
grounds of utility. 
It was Grotius who made the first concerted attempt to assess the justifiability of 
preventive war by reference to a systematic treatment of just war principles and was aware of 
tensions within the tradition with respect to fear as an instinctive response to threat and the 
need to treat both fear and threat within the context of law, for, as he puts it, “where judicial 
means fail, war begins”.29 Indeed, Grotius sets his entire treatment of fear and threat from the 
outset within the context of law. Building on the analogy between legal action and war, Grotius 
observes that procedures may be directed either against offenses that have not yet been 
committed (non factum), or against offenses that have already been carried out: ‘It has already 
been proved that when our lives are threatened with immediate danger, it is lawful to kill the 
aggressor, if the danger cannot otherwise be avoided …. We must observe that this kind of 
                                                
27 Gentili, De iure belli, I, XIV. 
28 Gentili, De iure belli, ibid. 
29 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. II, p.61.  
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defence derives its origin from the principle of self’.30 The intention should not be to kill but to 
save one’s own life. The danger must be immediate and those merely planning an attack in the 
future may not be killed. The assumption should not be that there is a right to kill but rather 
‘that my knowing it will lead me to apply for the legal remedies of prevention’.31 Steps will be 
to prevent imminent harm (damni infecti) are allowable only if the danger is immediate 
(praesens or quasi in puncto)32 but fear alone is an insufficient standard for decision-making 
about the limits of defensive action but public authorities may be justified in undertaking short-
term preemptive action only when the target of such action has been found guilty of conspiracy 
to commit future aggression.  
Focusing initially on the conditions of private self-defense, Grotius explains that if an 
assailant seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest, the crime should be 
forestalled it all possible but that the assailant may be killed in situations where the risk of 
harm is truly immediate. Under less urgent circumstances other measures will have to be 
adopted. Citing Cicero who warned in On Duties Bk 1 that most injuries have their origin in 
fear and creates a vicious circle of fear, since he who plans to do harm to another fears that, 
otherwise he may himself suffer harm, Grotius is clear both that we have a right to kill the 
assailant (or, indeed, a robber who horrifies the property-owner by his unexpected presence) 
but that public authorities have particular responsibilities to undertake long-term preventive 
action where judicial remedies exist.33 The human condition is such that no full security can be 
enjoyed and protection against uncertain fears must be sought ‘not from violence, but from the 
divine providence, and defensive precaution’.34 In this, he lauds the ancient monarchs who did 
not shrink from exposing their acts to the judgment of mortals and gods. Fear alone is an 
insufficient standard for decision-making about the limits of defensive action.  
Grotius’s position was close to what today we might call ‘last resort’. Vattel, another 
figure in the early modern humanist tradition, holds less strictly to the correlation of crime and 
punishment found in Grotius and leans toward question of what is prudential. In close 
similarity to Grotius, Vattel holds that ‘an act in violation of justice can never be truly 
beneficial to the state’.35 This excludes purely preventive measures except when the menacing 
                                                
30 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. III, p.63. 
31 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. V, p.65. 
32 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. V, p.64. ‘The danger must be immediate, which is one necessary 
point. Though it must be confessed, that when an assailant seizes any weapon with an apparent intention 
to kill me I have a right to anticipate and prevent the danger.’ 
33 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. XVI, p.69. 
34 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. XVII, p.70. 
35 Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens, 1758, in Charles G. Fenwick, The Law of Nations or the Principles 
of Natural Law, Applied to the Conduct and the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Institution, 1916), §30. Cited in Reichberg, ‘Preventive War’, p.52. 
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power has the ability to oppress a neighboring country its whole existence is thereby at stake it 
intends to do so has shown signs (marques) of ‘injustice, greed, ambition, and a will to 
dominate in the past.36 But Vattel allows preventive measures to be taken when the menacing 
power has the ability to oppress a neighboring country, intends to do so, and has shown signs 
(marques) of “injustice, greed, ambition, and a will to dominate” in the past, such that the 
whole existence of the country is thereby at stake, although it is not entirely evident the extent 
to which Vattel is referring here to imminent harm or a long-range plan by which the 
formidable power hopes one day to dominate other less powerful neighbors.  
It is clear from even this brief overview that the JWT(s) do not speak with one voice. 
Theorists lean in different directions with respect to the tension between fear as a primitive, 
instinctive response to a viable threat when one’s very survival might be at stake and the need 
amongst civilised peoples to assess preventive (ad bellum) strategies justified first and 
foremost on grounds of justice and of law. Present-day proponents of the classical, theological 
JWT face choices about where to locate themselves on the spectrum between permission and 
and restriction. Amidst this tension, I suggest drawing on the tradition as follows: 
1. acceptance that fear is natural to the human condition, but warning against 
allowing fear alone to determine action because fear can either be virtuous or 
undermine reason; 
2. recognition of frequent need for (mid- to long-term) preventive action, especially 
defensive and political; 
3. recognition of occasional need for preemptive action but only under the strictest 
application of the principles of immediacy, necessity and proportionality; 
4. advocacy, with Grotius, of the need for a strong international legal framework 
within which contextualise all relevant risk because two core convictions remain 
vitally important:  
a. war begins where the power of law ends; 
b. there are methods in law to prevent intended injuries, as well as remedies 
for those actually committed. 
Risk and the Need to Maintain ‘Service Provision’ 
With this in mind we, turn to our case-study. The UK National Security Strategy 2010 suggests 
that, in effect, cyberspace is the ‘fourth utility’ alongside electricity, gas and water.37 A 
                                                
36 Vattel, Le droit des gens, §44. 
37 NSS 3.28. 
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question facing governments is now best to maintain the service provision of cyberspace when 
so-called hybrid conflict is increasingly a means by which battles are fought. At the time of 
writing, the NATO Summit in Cardiff (September 2014) was attracting debate in the press 
about the conditions under which the international community distinguishes armed conflict 
from peacetime when different laws apply. ‘Nato summit on ‘high alert’ for cyber attack’ was 
Sam Jones’s headline in the Financial Times.38 Nato, he reported a few weeks earlier, has been 
the target of several sensitively timed cyber attacks this year. Across Europe evidence has 
emerged in recent months of extensive and sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns being 
waged against diplomatic targets.39 ‘Unorthodox tactics are nothing new in conflict’. Since 
2010, however, ‘Ukrainian computer systems have been the target of a virulent piece of 
computer malware known as Snake. … Other levers of power have been overtly pulled for 
years’. Increasingly, however, so-called hybrid conflict comprises a kaleidoscope of regular 
and irregular fighting and means of undermining countries from the inside as well as 
intimidating through displays of strength, economic coercion, and such like: ‘Russia’s New Art 
of War’.40 
Threats in cyberspace as part of hybrid warfare strategies blur the boundary between 
ordinary and extraordinary means in just war reasoning, and consequently render the familiar 
criteria of ‘just cause’, ‘right intention’, and ‘right authority’ increasingly difficult to apply. 
More specifically, it is not always clear whether and/or when a cyber attack constitutes an 
attack or wrongful use of force under the UN Charter or in violation of other customary 
international humanitarian law. Compare Article 51 (1945) with a recent statement by 
President Obama concerning US International Strategy for Cyber Space (2011). 
UN Charter Art. 51 (1945) US International Strategy for Cyber Space 
(2011) 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
When warranted, the United States will 
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we 
would to any other threat to our country. All 
                                                
38 Sam Jones, September 3, 2014. ft.com/uk http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bd29b7b6-335a-11e4-9607-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3CEjQ4emC (accessed 19 October, 2014). 
39 Sam Jones, August 28, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CQPNClOw (accessed 19 October, 2014). 
40 Sam Jones, ibid. N.b.: Three ‘cyber’ cases have been much discussed in recent literature: Estonia & 
NATO, April 2007, where, in response to the moving of a Soviet War Memorial, hackers began 
interfering with Estonian government websites through distributed denial of service attacks; Georgia-
Russia, 2008, which was the known use of the internet during a conventional armed conflict to interfere 
with civilian use of the internet; Stuxnet, 2009-2010, when a computer worm infected computers used in 
the Iranian nuclear programme. 
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a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.’ 
states possess an inherent right to self-
defense, and we recognise that certain hostile 
acts conducted through cyberspace could 
compel actions under the commitments we 
have with our military partners. 
Article 51 is concerned with armed attacks against a Member of the United Nations but the 
vast majority of cyber-attacks are not carried out by government-sponsored hackers but by 
criminals intending to steal business secrets and financial information.41 When does a cyber 
operation amount to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” such that 
the Security Council may authorize a response thereto? When does a cyber operation constitute 
an “armed attack,” such that the victim-state may defend itself, even kinetically, pursuant to 
the right of self-defence set forth in Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international 
law?42  
To date, the most significant scholarship on the matter is The Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare that attempts to restate international law as 
applicable to armed conflict in the face of questions about cyber attacks.43 The Tallinn Manual 
is not international law but represents the views of experts asking whether a ‘use of force’ is 
only kinetic or can include cyber attacks. It looks at the characteristics of kinetic force and 
finds overlaps with cyber attacks in terms of the severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, 
measurability of effects, military character, State involvement, and such like. Not only kinetic 
attacks, it suggests, are included under existing international law as a use of force because 
cyber attacks too can rise to the level of an armed attack depending upon their scale and 
effects, that is, whether they kill persons and damage property.44 An attack on a stock exchange 
or shutting down the banks would not count as a use of force under international law according 
to this method of comparing cyber attack to kinetic force, nor would the gathering of cyber 
intelligence gathering outside of on-going armed conflict but over-chlorinating a water supply 
so that people became ill and died, or tinkering with computers in air traffic control, probably 
would do so. 
                                                
41 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
(2012), Vol. 17 No. 2, 187–209, at p.196. 
42 For a useful summary of the most pertinent questions, see Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and 
the Jus ad Bellum Revisited’, Villanova Law Review (2011), Vol. 56, 569-605. 
43 Michael N. Schmitt, Ed., The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(CUP, 2013). 
44 The Tallinn Manual, p.48. 
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The Just War Tradition Today 
The JWT was never a set of criteria or check-list to be applied but ways of reasoning that 
asked about what kinds of military actions are justifiable, when and how not to separate 
immediate threats to any given party from wider national or international good, how to fear 
well, and much more. Of course, contexts and situations change and some aspects of hybrid 
warfare in the 21st century are new. But it is unhelpful and unnecessary to view the JWT in 
static terms that cannot cope with rapidly changing contexts. The important question for the 
Christian ethicist is not whether old templates and check-lists still fit but what is demanded 
today in the face of known and unknown threats, and how to address the core issues of why 
and how justice is still a reliable metric with which to evaluate the causes and conduct of 
armed conflict. The following suggestions are ventured. 
First, in the tradition from Aquinas et al., fearing wisely and virtuously means inter alia in 
ways that do not separate seemingly immediate risks to one nation-state from wider questions 
about international order and common good. This might include governmental awakening of 
some to the need for a security strategy comparable to discussions in previous decades of 
military preparedness. This is different from weak governments manipulating public anxiety to 
increase electoral advantage or other powers: ‘Better in that situation to summon the courage to 
oppose power with power and have the wisdom to remind ourselves that because we share the 
same human nature with our enemies, we are equally susceptible to their vices’.45 
Second, we may affirm with Grotius that a strong international legal framework is needed 
if threats are to be faced in ways do not fall foul of this irrationality, and if methods in law are 
to be used to prevent intended injuries as well as react to those already committed. It is 
regrettable that The Tallinn Manual when first published did not include attention to peacetime 
international law governing telecommunications, the security of international financial 
relations, and such like. Consider the analogy, to chemical weapons, urges Mary Ellen 
O’Connell. Chemicals may be turned into powerful weapons of mass destruction, which 
defence officials need to plan for, but the non-military sector is where most chemical use and 
regulation is found; the international community could not tolerate the immensely useful 
chemical sector being dominated by the military.46 O’Connell is concerned about the rush to 
designate the majority of cyber attacks as acts of war: ‘[T]he military paradigm is the wrong 
                                                
45 Robin Lovin, ‘Security and the State: a Christian Realist Perspective on the World since 9/11’ in 
Esther D. Reed and Michael Dumper, Eds, Civil Liberties, National Security and Prospects for 
Consensus: Legal, Philosophical and Religious Perspectives (CUP, 2014). 
46 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security and International Law’, Chatham House 29 May, 2013. 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/290512s
ummary.pdf (accessed 19 October, 2014). 
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one for cyber security’. 47  The military paradigm won’t be the wrong one for all aspects of 
cyber security but O’Connell’s warning is well made: ‘where the power of law ceases, there 
war begins’. A strong international community capable of strengthening, as appropriate, law 
governing trade, economic rights, non-intervention, and more, is necessary alongside attention 
to the law of self-defence. 
Third, like predecessors who stood variously in the JWT(s), we face questions today about 
whether to err toward restriction or permissiveness in interpretation of criteria and handling of 
questions about justice. Michael N Schmitt of the US Naval War College might well be correct 
that the current The Tallinn Manual standards will not survive for long. To date, he says, states 
have refrained from characterizing any cyber operations conducted outside the context of an 
on-going armed conflict as either international or non-international armed conflict.48 ‘Be that 
as it may, cyber operations will in the future inevitably present difficult conflict classification 
challenges for States. With regard to international armed conflict, attribution of cyber 
operations conducted by non-State actors will likely prove even more problematic than the 
attribution to States of kinetic actions has been in the past. In the context of non-international 
armed conflict, qualification as an organized armed group will prove increasingly complex as 
the structures, means and prevalence of virtual organization grow and evolve. Perhaps most 
importantly, the approach taken to the interpretation of the term ‘armed’ is, although presently 
reflecting lex lata, unlikely to survive.’49 As States and non-State actors engaging in ever more 
destructive and disruptive cyber operations and societies becoming deeply dependent on the 
cyber infrastructure, Schmitt expects that state practice accompanied by opinio juris will result 
in a lowering of the current threshold.  
The law of cyber-armed conflict is necessarily a work in progress and will remain so for 
the immediate future. The question is how international law will change to take account of 
evolving threats, and how the most powerful nation-states in the international arena will 
exercise leadership. With some states and non-state actors engaging in ever more destructive 
and disruptive cyber operations, and with societies becoming deeply dependent on the cyber 
infrastructure, it is inevitable and desirable that international law will develop but the JWT 
calls for rigorous and renewed engagement with the principles of immediacy, necessity and 
proportionality. Unilateral lowering of current thresholds for military action could bring 
disastrous results.  
 
                                                
47 O’Connell, ibid. 
48 Michael Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Conflict’, Law Journal of Conflict and Security Law Vol. 
17, Issue 2, 245-260, at p.259. 
49 Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Conflict’, p.260. 
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